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RECENT CASES.
BANK DEPoSiTS-DEMAND-TOBIAS V. MORRIS, 28 Son. Rep. (Ala.) 517.-
Where suit was brought for money deposited in a bank but no demand made
at the bank for its payment. Held, no recovery.
There is authority to the effect that the filing of the suit would constitute
the demand, but equally strong authority is found to the contrary: Branch v.
Dawson, 33 Minn. 399; Downes v. Banks, 6 Hill 297, 2 Am. & Eng. 101.
CARRIERS-TERMINAL CHARGES-INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION V.
CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. R., 10S Fed. 249.-A charge of two dollars per car onlive
stock consigned to or from Chicago in addition to the regular charge for
transportation, when published as part of their rates, is not unreasonable and
unjust. Grosscup, C. J. (dissenting).
From this decision it would seem that a railroad need not furnish thesame
terminal service for live stock that they are required to for freight and passen-
gers. The distinction thus drawn does not seem to be an entirely satisfactory
one. Live stock can hardly be considered to-day, as an exceptional kind of
traffic. If the railroads furnished some means for receiving the stock, and it
was for the special convenience of the consumer that it was sent to the stock-
yards, then theremight be some grounds for sustaining the extra charge. But
as it is, the distinction seems unwarranted.
CARRIERS--INJURY TO PASSENGER-LuRCH OF BNGINE-INSTRUCTIONS--
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-ENGINEER'S AUTHORITY-CLAIREBORNE V. MIS-
SOURI, ETC. RY. Co. oF TEXAS, 57 S. W. 336.-Plaintiffpaid brakeman lessthan
regular fare and was directed to sit on the foot-board of the engine. While in
the act of accepting an invitation from the engineer to ride in the cab, he fell,
owing to a sudden lurch of the engine. Held, that theR. R. was liable for his
injuries.
In McDonald v. R. R. Co., 22 S. W. 939, the court well said that "the neg-
ligence or trespass of a person does not place him beyond the protection of the
law. and does not excuse another for failure to exercise care to avoid injuring
him; much less does it justify a wilful injury." See also, R. R. Co. v.Jazo,
258 S. W. 714. As the engineer was responsible for the sudden lurch of his
machine and the act might be said to be within the scope of his duties, the em-
ployer is responsible for the resulting injury. Burnett v. Occhsner, 50 S. W.
562. R. R. Co. v. Zantzinger, 53 S. W. 379.
DEDICATION-EVIDENCE-PALEN V. CITY OF OCEAN CITY.-46 Atl. 774
(N. J.)-In 1R80 The Ocean City Association, a body corporate, being owner of
a large tract of land in the county of Cape May, constructed a road leading to
the bay, at the end of which there was a wharf, part of which projected beyond
high water mark. The map of street with said wharf marked thereon was
filed by the association with the county clerk. In 1886 the association con-
veyed to the plaintiff the wharf and certain other property. In 1897 the de-
fendant was incorporated a city, and subsequently took possession of the
wharf. Plaintiff brought an action ofejectment, decision was given in favor of
defendant. Plaintiff appeals. judgment reversed.
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Defendant contends that the wharf was dedicated to public use, when map
of the road and wharf was filed. This is certainly the rule as to roads, parks,
etc. (Price v. Inhabitants of Plainfield, 40 N.J. Law 608). In Tiedeman on
Real Property, page 579, it says, "any act such as platting and recording a
map, in which the streets are laid out, which shows a clear intention to dedi-
cate the land to the public use will be sufficient." But the court finds a distinc-
tion between a wharf and a street based on the case of O'Neill v. Annett, 27
N. J. Law 290,295, which says that the principle of dedication does notextend
to public landings.
EQUITY-INJUNCTION-PROTECTING EASEMENT-IVEs V. EDISON, ET AL, 83
N. W. 120.-Where, by deed conveying to complainant a store in a block, there
was granted to her an easement in a flight of stairs leading to the second story,
at the point at which the stairs were then located, and she refused permission
to change the location of the same, and commenced suit to enjoin the change
before it occurred, she is entitled to an injunction, though, after the bill was
dismissed, defendants, without waiting for the appeal, made the change, so
that the restoration of the stairs will cost them more than a jury might con-
sider it worth to the complainant. Hooker, J. and Long, J., dissenting.
As a general rule equity will only grant an injunction when irreparable in-
jury has been done, or is threatened. Starkle v. Richmond, 155 Mass. 188;
Hall v. Rood, 40 Mich. 46; 3 Por. Ex. fur. §1295, note. Irreparable injury
does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the in-
jury. It means that the injury must be a grievous one, and not adequately
reparable in damages. Kerr on Injunctions, p. 199, c. 15, §1. Swztzer v.
McCulloch, 76 Va. 777. The court seems to have thought that damages from
repeated suits would not have compensated the complainant and therefore
granted this injunction. The dissenting judges hold that this case would have
its appropriate remedy in a court of law and that an injunction should not be
granted. There are many cases similar to this, the decisions of which have
been varied between the two opinions given above. The weight of authority
may be said to be on the court side.
FORGERY-NOTE-LACK OF REVENUE STAMP--NVALIDITY OF INSTRUMENT
-NOTE GOOD ON FACE-KING V. STATE, 57 S. W. 840.-A forged note did not
bear a revenue stamp and the forged signature was that of a married woman
without her husband joining. Held, no defense. Henderson, J., dissenting.
As there was nothing on the note to show that the one by whom it pur-
ported to be made was a married woman, it is not relieved of its forged char-
acter, since to be void, the invalidity must appear on the face of the forged in-
strument. Bishop Cr.Law, 539. 3 Chit. Cr. Law, 1035. 13 Am.& Eng.
Enc. Law, 1088. Lack of a revenue stamp to a forged instrument is no de-
fense. Thomas v. State, 51 S. W. 242. The dissenting Justice contended that
an instrument to be the subject of forgery must be such as would, if genuine,
create a valid obligation. Coffey v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 198. Johnson v.
State, 51 S. W. 382.
INsURANCE-DIsAPPEARANCE OF INSURED-COMPROMISE-SEARS V. GRAND
LODGE OF ANCIENT ORDER OF UNITED WORKMEN-57 N. E. 618.-One insured
for $2,000 in the defendant's society disappeared, and was not heard of for
nine years. His widow believing him dead sued on the policy. To dispose of
the suit it was agreed that the defendant should pay $666 of the insurance,
which was in no event to be returned, and to pay the remaining $1,334 in six-
teen months, if insured did not return in the meantime. Before the $666 was
paid -the insured returned. Held, that the defendant must nevertheless paythe
$666. J. Graw dissenting.
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The court found that the parties had knowingly entered into a speculative
contract and that, although the event turned out very different from what
was anticipated, nevertheless this miscalculation was not such a mistake as
would entitle the disappointed party to relief. (Pomeroy's Equity, Sec. 855,
2 ed.) The two compromises of disputed claims are final and will be sustained
by the courts without regard to validity of the claims. Welthrum v. Kuhan,
61 N. Y. 623; Craus v. Hunter, 28 N. Y. 389.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEASE-REESE, ET AL., V. ZINN, ET AL., 103 Fed.
Rep. 97.-A lease so worded as to permit the lessee to determine it. Held,
void for lack of mutuality.
The court holds that a clause to this effect in the lessee's favor confers the
same power upon the lessor, thereby destroying the enforceability of the con-
tract. Kelly v. Waite, 22 Metc. (Mass.) 300. Guffey v. Herkill, 34 W.Va. 49.
12 A. & E. 757.
LEGAL HOLIDAY-NEW YEAR'S DAY-PAGE V. SHARNWALD-65 N.Y. Supp.
174.-Defendant was obliged to make a tender on January Ist, declared by
law to be a legal holiday. Held, it was not a dies non for making the tender
and applied only to dealings in commercial paper, opening of public offices, etc.
MASTER AND SERVANT-FELLOW SERVANTS-INJURY TO EMPLOYEE-
STUBER v. LouIsvILLE & N. R. Co., 102 Fed. 421.-A skilled machinist em-
ployed by the railroad to keep its pumps, tanks, and wells in condition, is not
a fellow servant with the engineer.
The injured machinist was riding on the defendant's train in order to reach
a point where he was to go to work, and was injured. If the court had found
him injured while working on a tank near the railroad it might have found
him a fellow servant under the decision in Morgan v. Vale of Neath Ry. Co.
L. R., 1 Q. B. 149. But his injury was incurred while on the way to work,
not while engaged in work. This establishes a distinction whose soundness
is not unquestioned.
MASTER AND SERVANT-FELLOW SERVANTs-TRAIN DISPATCHER AND
TRAINMEN-MISSOUR, K. & T. RY. v. ELLIOTT, ET AL., 102 Fed. 96.-Held,
that a train dispatcher is not a fellow servant with the employees operating
such trains.
The question of fellow servants is ably discussed from both sides in this
case. It is hard to see how a train dispatcher is in such a position as to
have us consider him an alter ego of the company. Yet this is the view of
the majority. He does not represent his master any more than the engineer
does in his line, nor is he at the head of a department. A consideration of
the principles on which is based this doctrine of fellow servants would seem
to favor the views of the dissentingjudge. R.R.v. Peterson. 162 U. S.346;
166, U. S. 399.
PHYSICIA--SmT FOR SERVICE-EBNER V. MACKEY, 57 N. B. (Ills.) 834.-
The plaintiff in this case had acted as physician for the husband of the defend-
ant covering a period of several years before the death of the defendant's hus-
band. The plaintiff brought suit for services rendered. The defendant refused
payment on the ground thattheplaintiff's visits were of unnecessary frequency
and hence his claims were exorbitant. Held, that a physician ought to be the
sole judge of the necessary frequency of his visits, and need not prove the neces-
sity for making them in order to get compensation.
This decision is clearly right in principle. & physician being responsiblefor
the want of care and faithful attention to his patients, a contrary rule would
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work great hardship to him. Then so long as the party employing does not
discharge him or require him to come less frequently, he cannot afterwards
complain of the frequency of his visits. Wood on Master and Servant, See.
177; Toddy. Myres, 40 Cal. 357.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-FALSE IMPRISONMENT-SCOPE or AUTHOITY--
DUPRE v. CHILDS, 65 N. Y. Sup. 179.-Defendant owned a restaurant in New
York city. One of its rules prohibited its patrons from passing out without
stopping at the cashier's desk. Plaintiff who had not been served passed out,
knowing nothing of the rule, was followed by defendant's manager and caused
to be arrested. Held, the act was within the scope of the agent's authority
and principal was liable, although agent's instructions were not to leave the
restaurant. Mott v. Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543; Palmer v. Railway Co., 133 N. Y.
261. Two judges dissent, citing Mulligan v. R. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 506, on the
ground that it is not within the scope of the agent's authority.
RAILROADS-EJECTING TRESPASSERS--AUTHORITY or BRAKEMAN-COLLU-
SION-CARE OWING TRESPASSER-NEGLIGENcE-TExAs & P. RY. Co. v. BLACK,
57 S. W. 330 (Tex.).-Frank Black, a negro, paid regular fare to brakeman
who consented that heshould ride but later ordered him from thefreight train.
On refusing to leave the train the brakeman knocked Black off. Held, thatthe
Ry. Co. was liable for the resulting injuries. Stephens, J., dissenting.
In Ga. Ry. & B. Co. v. Wood, 94 Ga. 124, it was held that throwing stones
at trespassers was not in scope of brakeman's duty; in Rounds v. D., L. & W.
Ry. Co., 64 N. Y. 129, the jury was to decide whether or not the kicking of a
passenger from a moving train was within a baggageman'S authority; while
in the case at bar the court says absolutely that the ejction waswithintheac-
tual scope of the brakeman's employment. However, the court held that con-siderations of um nity imperativel  demand that railways so conduct their
business as not unnecessarily to injure even the trespasser. R. R. Co. v.
Grisley, 35 S. W. 815; R. R. Co. v. Bellew, 54 S. W. 1079.
The defense of collusion was not allowed because not pleaded specially.
Two recent cases give a fine discussion on collusion of this nature:-Brewing
v. R. R. Co., 66 N.W. 403 (Minn.); and R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 25 South. 865.
REGULATION FOR PROTECTION AGAINST CONTAGIOUS DISEASES-CoNSTITU-
TIONALITY-WONG WAI v. WILLIAMSON, ET AL., 103 Fed. 1.-The Board of
Health of San Francisco forbid any Chinese or Asiatic person from leaving the
city without first submitting to inoculation for the bubonic plague. Held,
to be an unconstitutional invasion of the rights of the persons againstwhom
it was directed.
The decision is based on the belief that the above regulation is not a nec-
essary one to protect the health of the city. There is nothing in the decision
to deny the well established rule that a health board has power to enact
proper rules and regulations of this sort. As a decision it simply shows that
courts will not allow its abuse. The court looks upon it as an oppressive dis-
crimination against the Chinese and further, as no consideration is taken asto
whether they have had the plague or have been exposed to it. The decision is
the result of careful, logical distinctions. While from a legal point of view
they can not but be commended, yet they might result disastrously in their
practical results.
TOWN BONDS-VALmITY-BoNA FIDE HOLDERS-CITIZENS SAvINGs BANK
v. TOWN or GREENBRG, 65 N. Y. Supp. 554.-Defendant town issued interest-
bearing bonds and delivered them to commissioners appointed by the Supreme
Court who bad power under a statute to sell them at not less than par. The
bonds were sold to a New York firm for their face value, but upon credit, and
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afterwards were transferred to plaintiff bank, a bona Eide holder. Held, they
were not sold as the statute required and hence were void at their inception
and continued so even in the hands of a bona fide holder. Illinois v. Dela-
field, 8 Paige, 527; Village of Ft. Edward v. Fish, 156 N.Y. 363; 50 N. E. 973.
The rule in the Federal Courts is different and .upon the same state of facts
the reverse was held. Town of Greenburg v. International Trust Co. 36 C.C.
A. 471, following Trust Co. v. Mercer Co. 180 U. S. 593; 18 Sup. Ct. 788.
TRADE-MARKS-PRIOR USE-NAME DESCRIPTIVE OF QUALITY-MEDLAR &
HOLMES SHOE CO., ET AL., V. THE DELSARTE MPG. Co. 46 AtI. 1089 (N.J.)
-Defendant, who is a maker of wearing apparel, was accustomed to select
from manufacturers' stocks, a certain shape of shoe, to which thby
applied the name "Delsarte," and had done this several years prior to its use
by the complainant, to indicate a whole line of shoes manufactured and sold
by the latter. Held, that defendant, since it had only used the word as de-
scriptive of a particular kind of shoe, selected by it from manufacturers' stocks,
and not as a fancy name, is not entitled to use it as a trade-mark for any kind
of shoes that it might make or sell.
Generic and descriptive words which denote quality cannot beappropriated
exclusively as trade-marks. Browne on Trade-Marks, par. 216, says: "The
name of a famous person, used merely as a fancy name, may become an ex-
clusive trade-mark," but a name of this character may also become genericand
descriptive of quality and therefore invalid as a trade-mark. Also Thompson
v. Winchester, 19 Pick. 214.
The court contends in this case, that since defendant only used the word
on one class of shoes, and not on all of those which it sold, it is not entitled to
its exclusive use.
TRADE UNION-INJUNCTION-CONSPIRAcY AGAINST PERSONS NOT MEMBERS
-PLANT, ET AL., V. WOODS, ET AL., 37 N. R. 1011.-The parties in this suit
were two labor unions *of the same craft and having substantially the same
constitution and by-laws. The plaintiff union was composed of workmen who
had formerly been members of the defendant union. The defendant union, by
threats of strikes and boycotts, tried to induce the members of the plaintiffsto
rejoin their union or suffer discharge. Held. that an injunction would lie to
prevent such action. Holmes, C. J., dissenting.
As to the right of the defendants to build up their own business, even to
the injury of their rivals, there can be no doubt. Manufacturing Co.v. Hollis,
54 Minn. 223; Macauley v. Tierney. 19 R. 1. 255. They had, however, no
right to forcepersonstojoin with them nor, on the other hand,could they take
away from employers the right to employ whom they wished. Such action
being clearly contrary to principles of trade competition and personal liberty.
Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1; Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 97.
WATER AND WATER COURSES-ACCRETION AND RELICTION-OWNERSHIP-
OCEAN CITY AssOcIATION V. SHRIVER, 46 At. 690 (N. J.)-Plaintiff owned a
tract of land bordering on the ocean. This tract was platted with a street
running parallel to the sea and about 250 feet from it. In 1884 plaintiff con-
veyed a lot to defendant's grantor fronting on such street. In 1895 the lotwas
conveyed to the defendant, by the description in the first deed, at which time
the oceanhad washed away the street, the water line coming up to the lot.
Shortly afterwards the ocean began to recede, and defendant received a grant
from the riparian commissioners of a strip of land extending from his lot to
high water mark, conditional on his ownership of the lands to whichthegrant
attached. Held, that if plaintiff owned the land on the line of high water in
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front of his lot at the time of its deed to defendant's grantor, it is the owner
of the land obtained by accretion. Judgment for plaintiff.
When waterwashes up new land it is a well settled doctrine that the part
thus formed belongs to the riparian owner. But we have in the above case a
peculiar state of affairs, since thereare two persons who were at differenttimes
*iarian owners. The defendant became a riparian owner because the plaint-
if's land was washed away by the ocean. In the case of Mabry v. Norton,
100 N. Y. 424, it is said that if submerged land should, by the gradual opera-
tion ofthe sea, be brought to the surface again, the proprietorship of the
original owner is restored, provided the boundaries can be reestablished.
